diff --git a/scripts/test-login-rate-limit.ts b/scripts/test-login-rate-limit.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1892c87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/test-login-rate-limit.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+import "dotenv/config";
+
+/**
+ * Login throttling (rate-limit scope `login`, checked in verifyIdentityPassword):
+ *  (1) within the limit a wrong password returns null, the right one succeeds
+ *  (2) after exceeding the per-account limit even the correct password returns null
+ *  (3) other accounts are unaffected by one account's counter (per-account key)
+ *  (4) resetRateLimits restores access (in-memory counter)
+ * Outside a request there is no IP → only the account counter applies (documented behaviour).
+ */
+import { prisma } from "../src/server/db";
+import { verifyIdentityPassword } from "../src/server/auth";
+import { RATE_LIMITS, resetRateLimits } from "../src/server/rate-limit";
+import { hashPassword } from "../src/server/password";
+
+let failures = 0;
+const ok = (cond: boolean, msg: string) => {
+  console.log(`${cond ? "✓" : "✗ FEHLER"} ${msg}`);
+  if (!cond) failures++;
+};
+
+async function main() {
+  const stamp = Date.now();
+  const pw = "Richtig-Passwort-2026!";
+  const emailA = `zz-rl-a-${stamp}@example.test`;
+  const emailB = `zz-rl-b-${stamp}@example.test`;
+  const hash = await hashPassword(pw);
+  const [a, b] = await Promise.all([
+    prisma.identity.create({ data: { email: emailA, passwordHash: hash } }),
+    prisma.identity.create({ data: { email: emailB, passwordHash: hash } }),
+  ]);
+  resetRateLimits();
+  try {
+    // (1) wrong then right, far below the limit (lockout after 5 failures is a separate mechanism)
+    ok((await verifyIdentityPassword(emailA, "falsch")) === null, "(1) falsches Passwort → null");
+    await prisma.identity.update({ where: { id: a.id }, data: { failedLogins: 0, lockedUntil: null } });
+    ok((await verifyIdentityPassword(emailA, pw))?.identityId === a.id, "(1) richtiges Passwort → Erfolg");
+
+    // (2) exhaust the per-account limit with successful attempts (no lockout involved)
+    const limit = RATE_LIMITS.login.limit;
+    for (let i = 0; i < limit; i++) await verifyIdentityPassword(emailA, pw);
+    ok((await verifyIdentityPassword(emailA, pw)) === null, `(2) nach ${limit}+ Versuchen: auch richtiges Passwort → null (gedrosselt)`);
+
+    // (3) other account unaffected
+    ok((await verifyIdentityPassword(emailB, pw))?.identityId === b.id, "(3) anderes Konto nicht betroffen");
+
+    // (4) reset
+    resetRateLimits();
+    ok((await verifyIdentityPassword(emailA, pw))?.identityId === a.id, "(4) nach Reset wieder möglich");
+  } finally {
+    await prisma.identity.deleteMany({ where: { id: { in: [a.id, b.id] } } });
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  }
+  console.log(failures ? `\n${failures} Fehler` : "\nOK — Login-Drosselung je Konto wirksam.");
+  process.exit(failures ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+main().catch((err) => {
+  console.error(err);
+  process.exit(1);
+});
diff --git a/src/server/auth.ts b/src/server/auth.ts
index 70d6828..ef97727 100644
--- a/src/server/auth.ts
+++ b/src/server/auth.ts
@@ -202,6 +202,16 @@ export async function verifyIdentityPassword(
   password: string,
 ): Promise<{ identityId: string; mfaRequired: boolean } | null> {
   assertSecureEnv();
+  // Throttle per IP and per account before touching the identity (password spraying, F-05 follow-up).
+  // Limited attempts look exactly like a failed login: generic result, constant-time dummy hash.
+  const { clientIp } = await import("@/server/auth-selfservice");
+  const { checkRateLimit } = await import("@/server/rate-limit");
+  const throttle = checkRateLimit("login", { ip: await clientIp(), account: email.toLowerCase() });
+  if (!throttle.allowed) {
+    await verifyPassword(await dummyHash(), password);
+    console.warn(`[auth] login rate limited (retry after ${throttle.retryAfterSeconds}s)`);
+    return null;
+  }
   const identity = await prisma.identity.findUnique({ where: { email: email.toLowerCase() } });
   if (!identity || identity.status !== "ACTIVE") {
     await verifyPassword(await dummyHash(), password); // konstante Laufzeit (F-05)
diff --git a/src/server/mail/worker.ts b/src/server/mail/worker.ts
index 46c281c..c1b3078 100644
--- a/src/server/mail/worker.ts
+++ b/src/server/mail/worker.ts
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { UnrecoverableError, Worker, type Job } from "bullmq";
-import { deliverMail, markMailFailed, MailNotConfiguredError } from "./deliver";
+import { deliverMail, markMailFailed, MailAttachmentError, MailNotConfiguredError } from "./deliver";
 import { closeQueues, getConnection, getDeadLetterQueue, getSchedulerQueue } from "./queue";
 import { DUE_REMINDER_JOB, MAIL_QUEUE, SCHEDULER_QUEUE, type MailJob } from "./job";
 import { closeMailProvider } from "./provider-smtp";
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ export function startMailWorker(): Worker<MailJob> {
         const { messageId } = await deliverMail(job.data);
         return { messageId };
       } catch (err) {
-        if (err instanceof MailNotConfiguredError) {
-          // Nicht wiederholen — die Konfiguration ändert sich nicht durch Warten.
+        if (err instanceof MailNotConfiguredError || err instanceof MailAttachmentError) {
+          // Nicht wiederholen — Konfiguration bzw. ein unzulässiger/fehlender Anhang
+          // (fremder Mandant, Prüfsumme, Größe) ändern sich nicht durch Warten.
           // BullMQ bricht die Retry-Kette bei UnrecoverableError sofort ab.
           throw new UnrecoverableError(err.message);
         }
diff --git a/src/server/rate-limit.ts b/src/server/rate-limit.ts
index 03775c7..b81b3c6 100644
--- a/src/server/rate-limit.ts
+++ b/src/server/rate-limit.ts
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ function perMinute(name: string, fallback: number): number {
 export const RATE_LIMITS = {
   /** Reset-Anfrage: 5 pro Stunde je IP und je Konto. */
   passwordResetRequest: { limit: 5, windowMs: 60 * 60_000 },
+  /** Login (Passwortprüfung): je IP und je Konto – bremst Password-Spraying über viele Konten. */
+  login: { limit: perMinute("LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_PER_15_MIN", 20), windowMs: 15 * 60_000 },
   /** Reset-Einlösung: begrenzt das Durchprobieren manipulierter Links. */
   passwordResetRedeem: { limit: 10, windowMs: 15 * 60_000 },
   /** Alt-Passwort-Prüfung bei Selbständerung. */
diff --git a/src/server/services/field/uploads.ts b/src/server/services/field/uploads.ts
index c6bc5a2..88372d8 100644
--- a/src/server/services/field/uploads.ts
+++ b/src/server/services/field/uploads.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { storage } from "@/server/storage/adapter";
 import { dispatchJob } from "@/server/jobs/dispatch";
 import { JOB_QUEUES } from "@/server/jobs/queues";
 import { ServiceError, type ServiceCtx } from "@/server/services/context";
-import { audit, isUniqueViolation, requireFieldOrder } from "./common";
+import { isUniqueViolation, requireFieldOrder } from "./common";
 import { storeFile } from "@/server/services/documents/store";
 import { sniffMime } from "./mime";
 
@@ -91,13 +91,6 @@ export async function storeFieldUpload(
     }
   }
 
-  await audit(ctx, "create", "document", doc.id, null, {
-    workOrderId: wo.id,
-    category: doc.category,
-    fileName: doc.fileName,
-    mimeType: doc.mimeType,
-    fileSize: doc.fileSize,
-    checksum: doc.checksum,
-  });
+  // The document `create` audit is written by services/documents/store.ts#storeFile.
   return { documentId: doc.id, duplicate: false };
 }