Basis: Certvia dev@a48c5fb als Fundament für Craftvia
Unveränderter Stand von certvia/dev (a48c5fb) plus Craftvia-Spezifikation und Brandbook unter docs/craftvia/. ISMS-Module werden im Folgecommit entfernt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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// Regressionstest der Mandantentrennung (Sicherheitsbefund F-02).
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//
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// Prüft den Hybrid-Guard aus `src/server/db.ts` (`dbForTenant`): ein Fremdzugriff
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// über `findUnique` darf keinen Datensatz eines anderen Mandanten preisgeben —
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// weder mit `select`-Projektion ohne `tenantId` (der ursprünglich ausnutzbare
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// Fall), noch mit `include`, ohne `select` oder über einen Compound-Unique-Key.
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// Der legitime Eigenzugriff muss unverändert funktionieren.
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//
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// Lauf: npx tsx scripts/test-tenant-isolation.ts
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// Nutzt die lokale Postgres-DB (Container isms-tool-postgres-1); .env liegt im Worktree.
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import "dotenv/config";
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import { prisma, dbForTenant } from "../src/server/db";
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let failures = 0;
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const ok = (cond: boolean, msg: string) => {
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console.log(`${cond ? "✓" : "✗ FEHLER"} ${msg}`);
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if (!cond) failures++;
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};
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/** Erwartet, dass `fn` wirft (z. B. Isolationsverletzung oder NotFound). */
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async function expectThrow(fn: () => Promise<unknown>, msg: string) {
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try {
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await fn();
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ok(false, `${msg} — kein Throw (Datenabfluss möglich!)`);
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} catch {
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ok(true, msg);
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}
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}
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/** Erwartet, dass `fn` `null` liefert (kein Datensatz, kein Abfluss). */
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async function expectNull(fn: () => Promise<unknown>, msg: string) {
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const r = await fn();
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ok(r === null, `${msg}${r === null ? "" : ` — statt null: ${JSON.stringify(r)}`}`);
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}
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const SLUG_A = "zz-sec-test-a";
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const SLUG_B = "zz-sec-test-b";
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async function cleanup() {
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const tenants = await prisma.tenant.findMany({
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where: { slug: { in: [SLUG_A, SLUG_B] } },
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select: { id: true },
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});
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const ids = tenants.map((t) => t.id);
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if (ids.length) {
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await prisma.risk.deleteMany({ where: { tenantId: { in: ids } } });
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await prisma.tenant.deleteMany({ where: { id: { in: ids } } });
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}
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}
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async function main() {
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// Idempotenz: eventuelle Reste eines früheren Laufs entfernen.
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await cleanup();
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// Zwei Test-Mandanten mit je einem Risiko anlegen (roher Client = ohne Guard).
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const tenantA = await prisma.tenant.create({ data: { name: "SEC-Test A", slug: SLUG_A } });
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const tenantB = await prisma.tenant.create({ data: { name: "SEC-Test B", slug: SLUG_B } });
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const riskA = await prisma.risk.create({
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data: { tenantId: tenantA.id, refNo: 900001, title: "Risiko A (eigen)", likelihood: 3, impact: 3, score: 9 },
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});
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const riskB = await prisma.risk.create({
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data: { tenantId: tenantB.id, refNo: 900001, title: "GEHEIM-B (fremd)", likelihood: 4, impact: 4, score: 16 },
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});
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const dbA = dbForTenant(tenantA.id);
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console.log("\n— Fremdzugriff (Mandant A liest Risiko von B) muss scheitern —");
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// (1) Der ursprüngliche Exploit: select-Projektion OHNE tenantId.
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await expectNull(
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() => dbA.risk.findUnique({ where: { id: riskB.id }, select: { refNo: true, title: true } }),
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"findUnique + select OHNE tenantId → null (F-02-Kernfall)"
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);
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// (2) select MIT tenantId.
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await expectNull(
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() => dbA.risk.findUnique({ where: { id: riskB.id }, select: { title: true, tenantId: true } }),
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"findUnique + select MIT tenantId → null"
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);
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// (3) include (tenantId wäre ohnehin enthalten).
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await expectNull(
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() => dbA.risk.findUnique({ where: { id: riskB.id }, include: { riskMeasures: true } }),
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"findUnique + include → null"
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);
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// (4) ohne select/include.
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await expectNull(
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() => dbA.risk.findUnique({ where: { id: riskB.id } }),
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"findUnique ohne Projektion → null"
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);
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// (5) findUniqueOrThrow → muss werfen statt fremden Datensatz zu liefern.
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await expectThrow(
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() => dbA.risk.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: riskB.id }, select: { title: true } }),
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"findUniqueOrThrow + select OHNE tenantId → Throw"
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);
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// (6) Compound-Unique-Key (tenantId_refNo) mit fremdem tenantId, select ohne tenantId.
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await expectThrow(
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() =>
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dbA.risk.findUnique({
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where: { tenantId_refNo: { tenantId: tenantB.id, refNo: riskB.refNo } },
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select: { title: true },
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}),
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"findUnique über Compound-Key (fremd) + select → Throw (fail-closed)"
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);
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// (7) Compound-Unique-Key mit fremdem tenantId, ohne select.
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await expectThrow(
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() =>
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dbA.risk.findUnique({
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where: { tenantId_refNo: { tenantId: tenantB.id, refNo: riskB.refNo } },
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}),
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"findUnique über Compound-Key (fremd) ohne select → Throw"
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);
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console.log("\n— Legitimer Eigenzugriff (Mandant A liest eigenes Risiko A) muss funktionieren —");
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// (8) skalarer Key + select: Treffer, und tenantId darf NICHT auftauchen (kein Injektions-Leck).
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const own1 = await dbA.risk.findUnique({ where: { id: riskA.id }, select: { title: true } });
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ok(own1?.title === riskA.title, "Eigenzugriff findUnique + select → Treffer");
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ok(own1 !== null && !("tenantId" in (own1 as object)), "Eigenzugriff select {title} → Rückgabe OHNE tenantId");
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// (9) Compound-Key (eigen) + select: Treffer, injiziertes tenantId wieder entfernt.
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const own2 = await dbA.risk.findUnique({
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where: { tenantId_refNo: { tenantId: tenantA.id, refNo: riskA.refNo } },
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select: { title: true },
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});
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ok(own2?.title === riskA.title, "Eigenzugriff über Compound-Key + select → Treffer");
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ok(own2 !== null && !("tenantId" in (own2 as object)), "Compound-Key select {title} → Rückgabe OHNE tenantId (Injektion bereinigt)");
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// (10) ohne Projektion: voller Datensatz inkl. tenantId (Normalfall).
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const own3 = await dbA.risk.findUnique({ where: { id: riskA.id } });
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ok(own3?.tenantId === tenantA.id, "Eigenzugriff ohne Projektion → voller Datensatz inkl. tenantId");
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// (11) findUniqueOrThrow auf eigenen Datensatz → kein Throw.
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const own4 = await dbA.risk.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: riskA.id }, select: { title: true } });
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ok(own4.title === riskA.title, "Eigenzugriff findUniqueOrThrow → Treffer");
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}
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main()
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.then(async () => {
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await cleanup();
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await prisma.$disconnect();
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if (failures > 0) {
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console.error(`\n✗ ${failures} Testfall/-fälle fehlgeschlagen.`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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console.log("\nOK");
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})
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.catch(async (e) => {
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console.error(e);
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await cleanup().catch(() => {});
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await prisma.$disconnect();
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process.exit(1);
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});
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